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ABSTRACT 
This paper tackles the problem of aggregate TFP measurement using stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA). Data from Penn World Table 6.1 are used to estimate a world production frontier 
for a sample of 75 countries over a long period (1950-2000) taking advantage of the model 
offered by Battese & Coelli (1992). We also apply the decomposition of TFP suggested by Bauer 
(1990) and Kumbhakar (2000) to a smaller sample of 36 countries over the period 1970-2000 in 
order to evaluate the effects of changes in efficiency (technical and allocative), scale effects and 
technical change. This allows us to analyze the role of productivity and its components in 
economic growth of developed and developing nations in addition to the importance of factor 
accumulation. Although not much explored in the study of economic growth, frontier techniques 
seem to be of particular interest for that purpose since the separation of efficiency effects and 
technical change has a direct interpretation in terms of the catch-up debate.  
The estimated technical efficiency scores reveal the efficiency of nations in the production 
of non tradable goods since the GDP series used is PPP-adjusted. We also provide a second set of 
efficiency scores corrected in order to reveal efficiency in the production of tradable goods and 
rank them. When compared to the rankings of productivity indexes offered by non-frontier 
studies of Hall & Jones (1996) and Islam (1995) our ranking shows a somewhat more intuitive 
order of countries. Rankings of the technical change and scale effects components of TFP change 
are also very intuitive. We also show that productivity is responsible for virtually all the 
differences of performance between developed and developing countries in terms of rates of 
growth of income per worker. More important, we find that changes in allocative efficiency play  
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a crucial role in explaining differences in the productivity of developed and developing nations, 
even larger than the one played by the technology gap. 
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1 1    I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n   
This paper uses an alternative way of measuring total factor productivity based on the 
analysis of stochastic frontiers. The great advantage of this approach is the possibility that it 
offers of decomposing productivity change into parts that can have a straightforward and simple 
economic interpretation. The stochastic frontier model used assumes the existence of technical 
inefficiency which evolves following a particular behavior. These assumptions allow one to split 
productivity changes into two parts. The first is the change in technical efficiency, which 
measures the movement of an economy towards the production frontier; the second is technical 
progress, which measures shifts of the frontier over time.  
When applied to a flexible technology (e.g.: translog) – this technique further allows one 
to evaluate the presence of scale efficiency. The Bauer-Kumbhakar decomposition is then applied 
to a sample of 36 countries from 1970 to 2000, allowing the additional measurement of changes 
in allocative efficiency. The relative magnitude of this last component (allocative efficiency), 
together with technical change, seem to explain a large portion of the differences in economic 
growth between developed and developing countries. 
In the next section we present the hypothesis behind the stochastic frontier estimation and 
the TFP decomposition. Section 3 presents the data and the sample of countries used in the 
estimation. Section 4 presents the estimates of the world stochastic production frontier and 
discusses the technical efficiency scores in comparison to the productivity indexes suggested by 
Islam (1995) and Hall & Jones (1996). It also discusses estimates for technical progress and 
returns to scale. In section 5, we use the estimates of the previous section in order to decompose 
TFP change from 1965 to 2000. The role of technical progress and allocative efficiency change in 
economic growth of both developed and developing nations is highlighted in section 6. At last, 
we discuss the contribution of these new results for the recent debate about the sources of 
economic growth and the nature and role of TFP components.   
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2 2    T Th he e   s st to oc ch ha as st ti ic c   f fr ro on nt ti ie er r   a an nd d   T TF FP P   d de ec co om mp po os si it ti io on n   
The model used is basically that developed in the literature on technical efficiency and 
productivity, more specifically in the “statistical” and “parametric” branches of this literature, 
and is known as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The focus of SFA is to obtain an estimator 
for one of the components of TFP, the degree of technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is 
estimated in addition to technical change which in its turn is captured (as usual) by a time trend 
and interactions of the regressors with time. The model used here is essentially that developed 
(independently) by Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt (1977) and by Meeusen & van den Broeck (1977). 
Their formulation was extended by Pitt & Lee (1981) and Schmidt & Sickles (1984) for the panel 
data case. Since then a number of enhancements have been suggested, such as that of Battese & 
Coelli (1992), in which the technical inefficiency is modeled so as to be time variant. 
The general stochastic production frontier model is described by the equations below, 
where y is the vector for the quantities produced by the various countries, x is the vector for 
production factors used and β is the vector for the parameters defining the production technology. 
 ) u exp( ) v exp( ) , x , t ( f y − ⋅ ⋅ β = , u ≥  0         (1) 
The v and u terms (vectors) represent different error components. The first refers to the 
random part of the error, while the second represents technical inefficiency, i.e., the part that is a 
downward deviation from the production frontier (which can be inferred by the negative sign and 
the restriction  0 u ≥ ).  Thus,  ) v exp( ) , x , t ( f ⋅ β  represents the frontier of stochastic production and 
v has a symmetrical distribution to capture the random effects of measuring errors and exogenous 
shocks that cause the position of the deterministic nucleus of the frontier,  ) , x , t ( f β , to vary from 
country to country. The technical inefficiency is captured by the error component  ) u exp(− . For 
each country i and each time period t, we have: 
) u exp( ) v exp( ) , x , t ( f y it it it it − ⋅ ⋅ β = ;   N ,..., 1 i =  ,  T ,..., 1 t =     (2)  
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Once it is assumed that  ) , 0 ( N   iid ~ v
2 σ ; ) , ( NT ~ u
2
u σ µ  i.e., u has a normal-truncated 
distribution (with a nonnull average µ)
1; the two error components are independent of each other 
and x is supposed exogenous, the model can be estimated by maximum-likelihood techniques. 
Given these conditions, the traditional asymptotic properties of the MV estimators hold. In 
addition, we take the technical inefficiency component as time-variant, according to 
parametrization formulated by Battese & Coelli (1992)
2: 
[] i it u ) T t ( exp u ⋅ − η − = , 0 uit ≥  e  N ,..., 1 i =  e  ) i ( t τ ∈        (3) 
In the above expression,  ) i ( τ  represents the Ti periods of time for which we have 
available observations for the i-nth country, among the available T periods in the panel (i.e.,  ) i ( τ  
may contain all periods in the panel or only a subset of periods). The sign of η dictates the 
behaviour of technical inefficiency over time. When η is not significantly different from zero, we 
have technical inefficiency that does not vary in time, also called persistent inefficiency. This 
specification of the behavioral pattern of inefficiency is somewhat inflexible, as the model’s 
architects themselves admit, for, according to the formulation, technical inefficiency must grow 
at decreasing rates (η>0), or decrease at increasing rates (η<0). Moreover, the estimated value for 
η is the same for all countries in the sample, which means to say that the pattern of inefficiency 
rise or reduction is the same for all countries. 
Assuming a translog technology with two production factors, namelly capital (K) and 
labor (L), the model can be expressed in the following way: 
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 (4) 
                                                 
1 The restriction of a half-normal distribution µ=0 can be tested. 
2 Other parameterizations of u are offered by Kumbhakar (1990), Cornwell, Schmidt & Sickles (1990), Lee 
& Schmidt (1993).  
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The output elasticities with respect to K and L can be obtained from (4), working out the 
derivatives. Due to the use of a translog technology these elasticities are country and time 
specific. The technical progress measure is also specific for each country and period of time and 
can be obtained by time differentiation of (4).  
Bauer (1990) and Kumbhakar (2000) suggested a quite ingenious, yet simple, type of 
productivity decomposition which goes beyond the division of productivity changes into a catch-
up effect and a technical innovation effect. Such framework also accounts for scale of production 
effects and inefficient allocation of productive factors. To perform this decomposition, first of all 
we must estimate the model depicted by (3) and (4). Once this model is estimated, it is possible to 
“compose” the rate of total factor productivity change from the results. The components of 
productivity can be identified from algebraic manipulations from the expression that denotes the 
deterministic part of the production frontier combined with the usual expression for the the 









g L K PTF
& & &
− − =  



















In the expressions above and those that follow, the terms sK and sL represent the shares of 
capital and labor in income; εK and εL are output elasticities, with  L K RTS ε + ε = , RTS denoting 










= λ  . 
Substituting this result in the expression for the Divisia index, and after some algebraic 
manipulations we have: 
() [] () () [] L L L K K K L L K K PTF g s g s g g 1 RTS u PT g ⋅ − λ + ⋅ − λ + ⋅ λ + ⋅ λ ⋅ − + − = &  (5) 
That is, the rate of change in total factor productivity, PTF g , can be split into four elements:   
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(i) the technical progress, measured by 
t




= ;  
(ii) the change in technical efficiency, denoted by  u & − ; 
(iii) the change in the scale of production, given by () [] L L K K g g 1 RTS ⋅ λ + ⋅ λ ⋅ − ; 
and 
(iv) the change in allocative efficiency, measured by 
() () [] L L L K K K g s g s ⋅ − λ + ⋅ − λ .  
We can then study the impact of each of the components of TFP. If the technology is 
immutable, it does not contribute in any way to productivity gains. The same happens with 
technical inefficiency. If it does not vary in time, it also does not have any impact on the rate of 
variation of productivity. 
The contribution of economies of scale depends both on technology as well as on factor 
accumulation. If there are constant returns to scale, then RTS = 1, which cancels out the third 
component of the productivity variation. Otherwise, if RTS ≠ 1, part of the productivity change is 
explained by changes in the scale of production. In the case of increasing returns to scale (RTS > 
1) and an increase in the amount of productive factors we have a higher rate of productivity 
growth. If the amounts of production factors diminish, then we would have a reduction in the rate 
of productivity change. An inverse analogous reasoning can be made for decreasing returns and 
reduction (increase) in the amount of productive factors. 
Since 1 L K = λ + λ , the distances () K K s − λ  and () L L s − λ  are symmetric and have 
opposite signs. Therefore, a factor reallocation that, say, increases the intensity of labor and 
reduces that of capital will necessarily bring a change in allocative efficiency. Only when there 
are no inefficiencies or scale effects is the measure of productivity change identical to technical 
progress.  
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3 3    D Da at ta a   a an nd d   s sa am mp pl le e   
The database for this study consists of a non-balanced panel for aggregated output and 
production factors (K and L) of a sample of countries that includes both wealthy as well as poor 
nations. These data were basically obtained from Penn World Tables (PWT), version 6.1, for 
years 1950 to 2000. Below we detail the definitions of each series used in the econometric 
estimations We also describe the procedures used in selecting the countries and the time periods 
that actually comprise the econometric estimations. 
The output variable is GDP measured at constant prices (1996 US$), with purchasing 
power parity (PPP) adjustment. It is obtained by taking the real GDP per capita chain series 
(RGDPPCH) from PWT 6.1 and multiplying it by total population for each country.  
With respect to labor we use a proxy, the population of equivalent adults (peqa), obtained 
from PWT. The concept derives from population data: based on data for the total population, an 
average is computed that attributes a weight of 1 to people older than 15 and 0.5 to people aged 
up to 15 (pop>15 * 1 + pop<=15*0.5). These data are obtained indirectly from the PWT 6.1, by 
performing calculations using three variables: real GDP per capita chain series (rgdpch) was 









L ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ =  
Another possibility would be to use data pertaining to the labor force. These can be 
obtained through a transformation similar to the one described above, using the variable real 
GDP per worker (rgdpwok). Detailed analysis of the two series per country suggests that the peqa 
series is more reliable, which was the motivation of our choice. 
The perpetual inventory method was used to compute a series for the stock of capital of 
each nation in the sample
3. This method uses an initial capital stock estimate (computed from 
investment data), the supposition of a stable rate of growth for a given period, and additional 
                                                 
3 PWT 6.1 does not provide a series for the capital stock of the different countries. The documentation for 
PWT shows some variables as not yet available, among which Kapw – capital stock  per worker and some of 
its components (e.g.: residential construction; non residential construction; transport equipment).  
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suppositions regarding the depreciation rate. The measure of the initial capital stock is quite 
sensitive to the problems of measurement error regarding the flow of investment (and also the 
growth of GDP). 
The investment series used in computing the capital stock was obtained from multiplying 
the GDP, in constant 1996 local currency, by the “current” investment rate, and then converting 
this result to US$ using the 1996 exchange rate. GDP in 1996 local currency units was obtained 
by simply adding up all its components, which are available in the nafinalpwt spreadsheet of the 
PWT. The current investment rate was obtained dividing the value of investment in current local 
currency by the current GDP. The exchange rate used is obtained from the series XRAT, found in 
the nafinalpwt spreadsheet of the PWT 6.1. 
The initial capital stock is computed using the investment series. To do so, we took as the 
reference year, the year following that of the start of the investment series. We then used the 
perpetual inventory method to build up the remainder of the series. This procedure allowed each 
country to have its own capital stock series beginning in the first year for which we have 
available data for aggregated investment. 
The capital stock series used in this study was not adjusted for purchasing power parity 
disparities. More specifically it is taken in constant 1996 US$. This reflects the perception that 
investment decisions are taken considering relative domestic prices. Cohen & Soto (2003) also 
notice this and argue that PPP adjustment imposes on poorer countries relative prices that are 
different from those of the market, and an apparently high marginal productivity of capital. The 
price of investment goods has been decreasing over time in relation to the price of other products, 
a trend that has become more evident with the growing production of the information technology 
and communications industries. The quality of the products in these two industries has 
undoubtedly been improving, with prices continually dropping and capital use continually 
increasing. The consequence of this is that the importance of factor accumulation in the 
explanation of economic growth is increasing, making the part relative to productivity smaller. 
Once capital stock values undergo PPP adjustment, these effects are exacerbated. 
Factor shares sK and sL were basically obtained from two databases: (i) the Annual 
National Accounts, which brings information from 1970 to 2000 for 30 OECD members; and (ii)  
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United Nation’s System of National Accounts (SNA68). For OECD nations belonging to the 
sample in this study, we have used only this organization’s database (it is homogeneous and 
contains more information than the SNA, some of them estimates, though). Information 
pertaining to other nations, not OECD members, were obtained mostly from SNA68.  
Data for some countries were not available in SNA68 (usually those pertaining to the first 
and the last years of the sample). For these countries we tried other sources. Among them we can 
name ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribeean) for data pertaining 
to Bolivia (2000), Costa Rica
4 (2000), Trinidad & Tobago (2000) and Jamaica and Peru (1995 
and 2000), and MIDEPLAN (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación) for Chile (1975 to 1985 
and 2000)
 5. For Brazil, data used are from the local official statistical bureau (IBGE). 
The selection of countries included in the sample followed some criteria. The first and 
obvious criterion was availability of homogeneous data for the period in question. Nations that 
had a reduced number of observations were excluded. A minimum number of 30 continuous 
observations per country was set. Therefore, of the 203 economies listed in the PWT 6.1, 86 
countries that did not have information on either the labor force, GDP, investment, or exchange 
rate for the last 30 years were excluded. This criterion essentially removed from the sample a 
number of countries created or split in the last 20 to 30 years. 
Previously socialist economies, such as People’s Republic of China, Hungary, Romania 
and Poland, or those nations that are protectorates of others, such as Puerto Rico and Taiwan
6, 
were also excluded. The group of 86 excluded nations also includes those with a very small 
population – less than 500 thousand inhabitants in 2000. For this reason countries like Barbados, 
Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Luxembourg and Seychelles Islands were also left out. The only 
exception to this last rule was Iceland, a country with (“good quality”) information dating back to 
1950. 
                                                 
4 For Bolivia and Costa Rica the numbers for 2000 are actually those of 1999. 
5 For Chile, there was no available information for 1970 in any sources used. We used then the numbers for 
1973, first year for which the national accounts of this country displays that information. 
6 Hong Kong was kept in the sample, though .   
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Of the remaining 112 economies, another 13 were excluded because of lapses in the 
historical series caused by wars, civil wars or split-ups. In these cases, the estimation of capital 
stock using the perpetual inventory processes can clearly not be applied. The countries rejected 
due to this criterion were the following: Angola, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Guinea, Comoros, Haiti, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea 
and Zaire (presently Congo). Eighteen other nations were excluded because of having highly 
volatile GDP per capita and investment rate figures, which causes excessively high deviations in 
the capital stock estimations (namely, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameron, Congo 
Republic, Ivory Costa, Fiji Islands, Mauritius Islands, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Mali, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Tanzania and Togo). 
Note that all countries included in this last group are poor, most of them from Africa. A 
question could be raised here, arguing that this decision would create a biased analysis through 
selection. We argue that this is not a problem in this study, because the purpose here is to 
describe a quite flexible production frontier (translog): in this case, output elasticities with 
respect to the productive factors can vary among countries and in time, which renders flexibility 
to the adjustments. In the event we undertook an analysis using the Cobb-Douglas technology, 
elasticities would be constant and would express sample averages subject to selection bias. In this 
analysis, quite to the contrary, the selection should favor precise estimations, because the 
excluded economies (due to unreliable data) generally have a low “grade” in the ranking brought 
by the PWT in regard to data quality.
7 
This leaves us with 75 countries with data spanning from 1950 to 2000. The observations 
were taken for 11 different time periods, every 5 years, starting in 1950 and finishing in 2000. 
This type of procedure is rather common in the economic growth literature and is justified by the 
interest of studying long-term effects, and this can be perfectly addressed by more spaced time 
observations. Forbes (2000), to give one example, makes estimations with data gathered every 
five years and justifies this saying that yearly data contain short-term disturbances. Before 
proceeding to the estimations, the data were carefully reviewed, on a country per country basis. 
                                                 
7 See Table A, from Data Appendix for a Space-Time System of National Accounts: Penn World Table 6.1 
(PWT 6.1) p. 13 – available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ .  
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Special care was taken with the series for capital stock. It is known that estimations for initial 
capital stock can present problems that render capital stock data for the first years of the series 
less reliable. We must remember that the initial capital stock calculations presume a stable 
behavior for the economic growth rate (steady state), an assumption not very realistic. In the 
event the growth rate for the initial period is too low (much lower than that of steady state), the 
initial capital stock tends to be overestimated, and consequently these data appear to be reduced 
in the initial periods. The opposite can occur when the rate is high. Based on scatter plots (capital 
x GDP) we noticed the presence of observations for some countries that could suggest inadequate 
estimations of initial capital stock. This was the case of the following countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Syria. Therefore, the first two 
(or three) observations of the series pertaining these countries were eliminated.  
A similar problem occurred for some countries when scatter plots of production and 
population of equivalent adults were analyzed. Ireland, Greece and Cyprus experienced, at 
different moments, considerable reductions in their population of equivalent adults, presenting a 
behavior not compatible with the premise of factors diminishing returns. For the first two nations, 
this happened at the beginning of the series, a fact that could indicate problems with different 
sources for population data (up to 1960 the PWT’s population data come from the United Nations 
Development Centre and after this year they come from the World Bank). Consequently, we 
decided to exclude the first two observations of the series for Ireland (1950 and 1955) and the 
first (1955) for Greece.  
4 4    E Es st ti im ma at ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   w wo or rl ld d   s st to oc ch ha as st ti ic c   f fr ro on nt ti ie er r   ( (1 19 95 50 0- -2 20 00 00 0) )   
The model estimation was conducted using the STATA 8 software, which includes among 
its pre-programmed models that of Battese & Coelli (1992). Initially, a number of alternative 
specifications were tested, imposing different restrictions on the parameters of the translog 
technology. Likelihood ratios tests allow us to check if the restrictions are valid or not. These 
statistics are presented in Appendix I.   
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Parameters presented in Table 1 are all significant at 5%, except the capital elasticity, 
which is significant at 6.5%. The mean inefficiency, µ, is significantly different from zero at 1%, 
showing that the normal truncated distribution is an appropriate assumption (if it were not 
significant, we would fall back to the case of half-normal distribution). The estimated value of η 
is positive, which means that technical efficiency grows at decreasing rates (catch-up).  
βkn is negative, revealing the possibility of substitution between the production factors. 
The βt and βtt coefficients indicate that the neutral part of technical progress has negative effects 
on production and in order to achieve (positive) technical progress, it is necessary that the non-
neutral part of technical progress offsets these effects. The signs of βkt  and  βnt indicate, 
respectively, that the non-neutral part of the technical progress goes hand in hand with the capital 
accumulation (positive sign of βkt), and inversely with labor supply (negative sign of βnt), i.e., 
technical progress is labor-saving and is more intense in countries where capital is abundant. 
Table 1  Time-variant inefficiency model 
No. of observations = 746  Observations per country: min     =     3 
No. of  countries  =  75                 Average     =  9.9 
                 Maximum     =   11 
Log likelihood  =  272.07096         Wald χ2(8)= 14,540.41 
          Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 
Confidence interval  95% 
lny Coefficients  Standard  error  z  P>z 
lower               upper 
βt -0.1198  0.0455  -2.6300  0.0080  -0.2089  -0.0307 
βk 0.2457  0.1330  1.8500  0.0650  -0.0149  0.5064 
βn 0.3767  0.1883  2.0000  0.0450  0.0077  0.7458 
βtt -0.0075  0.0015  -5.1300  0.0000  -0.0103  -0.0046 
βkk 0.0275  0.0111  2.4900  0.0130  0.0058  0.0492 
βnn 0.0572  0.0216  2.6500  0.0080  0.0150  0.0995 
βkn -0.0605  0.0272  -2.2200  0.0260  -0.1138  -0.0072 
βkt 0.0106  0.0023  4.6100  0.0000  0.0061  0.0152 
βnt -0.0063  0.0030  -2.1100  0.0350  -0.0121  -0.0004 
β0  8.8115  1.8366  4.8000  0.0000 5.2119 12.4111 
µ 0.2074  0.0626  3.3100  0.0010  0.0846  0.3302 
η 0.0652  0.0116  5.5900  0.0000  0.0423  0.0880 
ln σ
2 -2.7946  0.2291  -12.2000  0.0000  -3.2437  -2.3456 
ilgt γ 0.6735  0.3514  1.9200  0.0550  -0.0153  1.3623 
σ
2 0.0611  0.0140      0.0390  0.0958 
γ 0.6623  0.0786      0.4962  0.7961 
σu
2 0.0405  0.0140      0.0131  0.0679 
σv
2 0.0206  0.0011      0.0184  0.0229  
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Inspection of the results for returns to scale, technical change, and technical efficiency 
reveals that these are economically meaningful. Table 2 shows country ranks for RTS, TE, and 
TP. The technical efficiency ranking must be viewed with caution. Although the presence of 
countries like Nicaragua, Venezuela and El Salvador in the first positions of the ranking does 
indeed seem odd, two aspects must be kept in mind: (i) these results are “conditional” on the 
capital-labor ratio; and (ii) the estimations took place using PPP adjusted figures for GDP. In 
other words, the first aspect mentioned means that, in a traditional Farrel diagram, a country such 
as Nicaragua is closer to the frontier, yet it is placed at the “edge” of the unit isoquant closest to 
the axis of the labor factor, at the same time that a country like Norway would be further from the 
frontier, but on the opposite edge of the isoquant (abundant capital, scarce labor). 
The second caveat means that the ordering of productivity reflects the efficiency in 
nontradables goods and services. When the value of technical efficiency is converted by the PPP 
factor, we have production efficiency at prices of tradable goods. This adjusted TE ranking is 
displayed next to the first one and shows a distinct ordering, in which developed countries are 
positioned at the top, led by the United States. These adjusted scores would better translate 
international competitiveness of countries.   
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Table 2.  Technical efficiency, returns to scale and technical progress, 2000 
Rank
1 NIC      0,975 USA      0,955 SYR 1,256 HKG 1,537 IND      1,148 JPN      0,79%
2 VEN      0,974 JPN      0,899 JOR 1,181 CAN 1,041 IDN      1,108 USA      0,44%
3 CAN      0,971 CHE      0,872 MEX 1,143 USA 1,000 USA      1,107 GER      0,27%
4 SLV      0,970 GBR      0,820 ITA 1,093 NOR 0,861 PAK      1,101 FRA      -0,11%
5 MEX      0,968 ISR      0,811 HKG 1,090 BEL 0,787 BRA      1,098 CHE      -0,31%
6 TUR      0,958 SWE      0,778 FRA 1,029 ESP 0,787 JPN      1,087 ITA      -0,34%
7 USA      0,955 CAN      0,770 BRA 1,002 FRA 0,787 MEX      1,085 GBR      -0,55%
8 ZAF      0,939 HKG      0,763 USA 1,000 JPN 0,787 PHL      1,081 NLD      -0,66%
9 CHL      0,932 DNK      0,761 CAN 0,987 DNK 0,748 EGY      1,078 AUS      -0,72%
10 IRN      0,929 NOR      0,740 ESP 0,983 GBR 0,712 TUR      1,077 AUT      -0,76%
11 GTM      0,928 ISL      0,740 PRT 0,980 NLD 0,712 IRN      1,076 CAN      -0,76%
12 TTO      0,924 SYR      0,723 GBR 0,962 SWE 0,712 THA      1,075 ESP      -0,79%
13 HKG      0,890 FIN      0,722 AUT 0,958 AUT 0,677 GER      1,075 NOR      -0,79%
14 TUN      0,883 IRL      0,717 BEL 0,948 GER 0,677 GBR      1,071 SWE      -0,82%
15 CRI      0,882 FRA      0,685 NLD 0,926 CHE 0,619 ITA      1,070 DNK      -0,83%
16 ISR      0,877 BEL      0,682 SWE 0,911 ISR 0,619 FRA      1,070 BEL      -0,89%
17 ZWE      0,867 VEN      0,672 GER 0,900 TTO 0,619 KOR      1,066 KOR      -1,13%
18 ECU      0,865 NLD      0,665 AUS 0,898 AUS 0,589 ZAF      1,066 FIN      -1,14%
19 LKA      0,858 AUT      0,656 CHE 0,873 ITA 0,589 COL      1,064 HKG      -1,28%
20 MYS      0,851 GER      0,643 VEN 0,873 NZL 0,589 ESP      1,062 NZL      -1,55%
21 COL      0,849 ITA      0,631 ISR 0,840 VEN 0,533 KEN      1,061 GRC      -1,61%
22 PRY      0,848 CRI      0,625 TTO 0,834 FIN 0,507 ARG      1,060 BRA      -1,62%
23 GBR      0,833 IRN      0,615 GTM 0,825 MEX 0,487 MAR      1,059 ARG      -1,68%
24 EGY      0,832 MEX      0,588 COL 0,800 SYR 0,463 NPL      1,056 PRT      -1,69%
25 URY      0,831 AUS      0,587 FIN 0,800 BRA 0,419 UGA      1,056 ISR      -1,83%
26 SEN      0,829 ESP      0,583 NOR 0,780 CRI 0,383 CAN      1,055 IRL      -1,89%
27 JOR      0,816 GRC      0,558 DNK 0,778 GRC 0,383 PER      1,053 MEX      -2,00%
28 PHL      0,816 JAM      0,558 IRL 0,770 IRL 0,383 VEN      1,051 MYS      -2,38%
29 GRC      0,809 ARG      0,511 TUN 0,762 KOR 0,383 GHA      1,051 ISL      -2,39%
30 NPL      0,800 URY      0,486 NZL 0,754 MYS 0,383 MYS      1,050 THA      -2,42%
31 PAN      0,796 PRT      0,480 TUR 0,751 URY 0,383 LKA      1,049 ZAF      -2,62%
32 ESP      0,790 NZL      0,466 JPN 0,744 ZAF 0,383 AUS      1,042 TUR      -2,64%
33 AUS      0,788 KOR      0,448 GRC 0,742 PRT 0,347 SYR      1,041 VEN      -2,69%
34 ARG      0,778 SLV      0,443 CRI 0,736 PER 0,330 CHL      1,041 CHL      -2,80%
35 PER      0,776 CHL      0,416 ARG 0,730 PRY 0,330 ZWE      1,039 IRN      -2,80%
36 ITA      0,776 PAN      0,415 URY 0,696 GTM 0,314 ECU      1,038 PER      -2,92%
37 IRL      0,774 TTO      0,404 KOR 0,664 MAR 0,314 NLD      1,038 COL      -2,95%
38 PRT      0,773 TUR      0,386 DOM 0,651 NIC 0,301 GTM      1,037 SYR      -3,01%
39 MAR      0,772 GAB      0,371 ZAF 0,645 COL 0,287 MWI      1,036 IDN      -3,16%
40 DOM      0,768 GTM      0,358 EGY 0,595 PAN 0,287 RWA      1,032 GAB      -3,21%
41 BEL      0,764 MYS      0,348 MAR 0,576 TUN 0,273 SEN      1,032 URY      -3,29%
42 FRA      0,755 ZAF      0,345 PER 0,565 TUR 0,273 TUN      1,030 PHL      -3,36%
43 FIN      0,752 BRA      0,339 MYS 0,560 ARG 0,259 TCD      1,030 IND      -3,51%
44 IDN      0,752 PER      0,337 SLV 0,557 JOR 0,259 GRC      1,029 TUN      -3,52%
45 BRA      0,750 JOR      0,325 PRY 0,541 SLV 0,247 PRT      1,029 EGY      -3,58%
46 HND      0,745 DOM      0,319 PAK 0,527 THA 0,247 BOL      1,028 TTO      -3,62%
47 BOL      0,744 HND      0,318 CHL 0,522 ECU 0,237 DOM      1,028 PAN      -3,71%
48 SWE      0,742 EGY      0,286 THA 0,513 CHL 0,225 BEL      1,028 MAR      -3,71%
49 NLD      0,738 COL      0,281 ECU 0,504 DOM 0,214 SWE      1,023 CRI      -3,73%
50 CHE      0,738 BOL      0,252 LKA 0,481 PAK 0,194 HND      1,022 JAM      -3,80%
51 RWA      0,737 TUN      0,252 BOL 0,469 PHL 0,186 AUT      1,021 ECU      -3,95%
52 PAK      0,734 ECU      0,250 PAN 0,463 BOL 0,169 SLV      1,020 DOM      -4,02%
53 TCD      0,722 PRY      0,242 HND 0,449 JAM 0,169 HKG      1,018 PRY      -4,10%
54 GAB      0,720 NIC      0,237 NIC 0,443 EGY 0,153 CHE      1,017 JOR      -4,25%
55 DNK      0,713 SEN      0,226 JAM 0,410 LKA 0,153 NIC      1,017 SLV      -4,29%
56 LSO      0,708 LSO      0,210 PHL 0,389 HND 0,126 PRY      1,016 GTM      -4,39%
57 NZL      0,703 MAR      0,209 IND 0,344 NPL 0,120 ISR      1,015 LKA      -4,48%
58 AUT      0,700 PHL      0,203 SEN 0,316 SEN 0,110 JOR      1,014 PAK      -4,53%
60 KOR      0,692 LKA      0,188 ZWE 0,275 UGA 0,104 DNK      1,010 BOL      -4,58%
61 JAM      0,678 ZWE      0,185 NPL 0,244 ZWE 0,104 FIN      1,010 HND      -4,90%
62 GER      0,677 THA      0,176 RWA 0,242 IND 0,071 CRI      1,006 ZWE      -4,90%
63 NOR      0,659 KEN      0,161 KEN 0,237 KEN 0,071 NOR      1,006 LSO      -5,19%
64 ISL      0,654 RWA      0,159 GHA 0,215 RWA 0,065 IRL      1,004 NIC      -5,24%
65 IND      0,640 UGA      0,158 UGA 0,162 MWI 0,058 URY      1,004 KEN      -5,32%
66 GHA      0,637 PAK      0,146 TCD 0,151 GHA 0,053 NZL      1,003 GHA      -5,49%
67 UGA      0,635 TCD      0,138 MWI 0,130 TCD 0,042 PAN      1,000 SEN      -5,50%
68 SYR      0,632 IDN      0,136 JAM      0,998 NPL      -5,94%
69 JPN      0,621 GHA      0,119 LSO      0,994 MWI      -6,10%
70 KEN      0,611 NPL      0,118 TTO      0,981 UGA      -6,19%
71 THA      0,595 IND      0,109 GAB      0,975 RWA      -6,43%
72 MWI      0,502 MWI      0,102 ISL      0,939 TCD      -6,56%
Techinical Effciency 
(US$)
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An interesting exercise is to compare our ranking to the productivity indices suggested by 
Islam (1995) and Hall & Jones (1996). The index of adjusted technical efficiency seems better 
suited for such comparisons, because it displays the efficiency in US$. This index is highly 
correlated
8 with those suggested by the above authors, with the advantage that this ordering 
seems to be more intuitive. The less productive nations remain practically unchanged at the 
bottom of the ranking, but the top of the productivity ranking no longer brings less developed 
nations, as in Hall & Jones (1996), for whom countries like Syria, Jordan, Mexico and Brazil are 
listed among the most productive economies, or as in Islam (1995), in which Hong Kong is 
considered the most productive nation – 53.7% more productive than the United States! 
The results for RTS are very intuitive. The countries at the top of the ranking depict 
increasing returns to scale. These are large countries from the population and territorial 
perspective. The bottom positions in the ranking are occupied by basically very small (in size and 
population) countries. Another fact that comes to our attention is that Germany, Great-Britain, 
Italy and France, all of them European nations of very homogeneous characteristics, are placed 
next each other in the ranking. 
The results for technical progress seem at first sight rather odd, with almost all of them 
being negative. Nonetheless, the ordering seems to match our intuition regarding the 
technological performance of the nations. At the top positions are Japan, United States, Germany 
and France. Among the countries at the bottom are the African nations, well-known for their lack 
of technological knowledge. A simple exercise of “casual empiricism” provides an interesting 
“test” of the existence of “economic intuition” behind the estimations of technical progress 
performed by the model. The idea is to evaluate if the measure of technical progress produced is 
related in any way to the effort to innovate carried out by countries in recent years. The scatter 
diagram for the technical progress measure and the natural logarithm of R&D expenses (average 
                                                 
8 The correlation coefficient between the adjusted technical efficiency index suggested here and the Hall & 
Jones (1996) index is 0.752, and the correlation index and the Islam (1995) index is 0.826, both significant at 
less than 1%. The correlation between the indices of the two studies named here is 0.740, also significant at 
less than 1%.  
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for 1990-2000) show us what seems to be, at least at first sight, a positive relation between these 
variables. 
Graph 1. Expenditures in R&D, human capital and technical progress, 2000 














































































Average years of schooling of population over 25 years






























































Fonte: Table 2 and WDI 2002.  
Another similar diagram, but relating the measure of technical progress with the average 
education level of the population shows another intuitive relation: countries with better educated 
population are also the ones with the highest levels of technical progress.  
In addition to the analysis of production frontiers using data at five-year intervals, two 
other experiments were carried out to evaluate the relative performance of the model: (i) the 
estimation of the stochastic frontier model using annual data, and (ii) the estimation of traditional 
panel data models (fixed effects and random effects). Regarding the first experiment, it can be 
said that five-year interval data yield better results than annual ones, as expected. In spite of 
being valid on the whole, the annual model generates non-significant coefficients associated to 
time, capital stock and the labor force: p(z) = 16.7%, 19.0% and 24.5%, respectively. Moreover, 
the model’s total variance is larger, given the existence of short-term variability in output (0.077 
as opposed to 0.061 in the model with five-year data). The average technical inefficiency, given 
by µ, is relatively high (0.249 compared to 0.207 in the five-year model), which leads this model  
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to have higher variance of technical efficiency and lower of technical progress (which comes out 
negative for all countries after 1997). For this reason, the influence of µ in the total variance also 
rises, from 66.3% to 77%. If the estimation of the technical inefficiency were based on the 
Battese & Coelli (1995) model, maybe it would be possible to control the effect of these short-
term variations.  
The estimates produced by the fixed-effects and random-effects models in turn came out 
quite inferior to those of the stochastic frontier models. The Hausman test (χ
2 = 49,03) favors the 
fixed effects model, although 4 out the 9 coefficients of the translog specification ended up being 
not significant at 10%. Furthermore, the results are not intuitive at all. Some countries have zero 
or negative labor elasticities, such as Iceland and South Korea, and the returns to scale vary 
greatly: the United States, to give an example, would have an estimated RTS of 1.26, whereas 
Iceland would be a mere 0.49. The estimations of technical progress likewise are not very 
reasonable: United States, Japan and Germany show large technical regress at the same time that 
Trinidad & Tobago, Lesotho and Jamaica have extraordinary technical progress. This result 
reinforces the idea that frontier models are better suited for the analysis of productivity in 
comparison with traditional econometric methods. 
5 5    T TF FP P   a an nd d   i it ts s   c co om mp po on ne en nt ts s   ( (1 19 97 70 0- -2 20 00 00 0) )   
With the results of the estimation of the model, obtained in Section 3 for the 75 countries 
of the sample, and the data on functional income distribution (sK and sL), it is possible to 
decompose productivity change in the manner shown in section 1. However data for factors 
shares in income are not available for all these economies. We managed to collect data for only 
36 of the 75 countries, and just from 1970 up to 2000. The “full” decomposition of TFP is then 
restrict to this group of 36 nations. Table 3 brings the results. 
The exercise of ordering the countries according to the magnitude of the variation of the 
average productivity change along these 30 years shows some interesting results. All top 
positions (until the 21
st in the ranking) are OECD countries. Among them, Japan’s performance 
stands out, with an average productivity growth rate of 2.42% p.a. during this period. The next  
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countries are Austria (1.77%), France (1.75%), Norway (1.53%), Switzerland (1.51%) and USA 
(1.49%). In the middle block we find some Latin American countries, such as Jamaica, Brazil, 
Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia, all of them with relatively low TFP growth rates. Brazil showed 
during this period an average rise in productivity of 0.39% per year. Among the other Latin 
American countries of the sample we see that Mexico, Costa Rica, and, surprisingly, Chile had 
reductions in productivity. Greece and Turkey are the only OECD members with negative 
productivity growth during this time. 
Countries that provided the largest contribution of technical progress in the variation of 
productivity for the 1970-2000 period were Japan, the United States, France, Switzerland, Italy, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia, in this order. Contributions for this group ranged 
from 0.56 to 0.30 percentage point per year, on average. As we can see, they are all developed 
countries that invest substantial amounts in R&D.   
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AUS 4.16  1.17 1.06 0.93 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.12 1.00
AUT 3.74  1.70 0.30 1.77 0.25 0.69 0.01 0.81 -0.03
BEL 3.29  1.60 0.31 1.40 0.23 0.52 0.03 0.61 -0.02
BOL 2.73  1.68 1.00 0.05 -0.55 0.57 0.00 0.02 0.00
BRA 5.59  4.51 1.13 0.39 0.01  0.55 0.41 -0.58 -0.44
CAN 4.14 1.87 1.10 0.98 0.26 0.06 0.12 0.54 0.19
CHE 2.03 1.31 0.52 1.51 0.40  0.59 -0.01 0.53 -1.30
CHL 4.98  3.88 0.87 -0.41 -0.30 0.13 0.11 -0.35 0.64
COL 4.93  3.73 1.05 -0.20 -0.30 0.31 0.20 -0.41 0.34
CRI 4.89  4.01 1.63 -0.32 -0.47  0.24 -0.12 0.03 -0.43
DNK 2.61 0.89 0.35 1.39 0.27 0.65 -0.01 0.47 -0.02
ESP 3.97  2.79 0.54 1.30 0.23 0.45 0.17 0.44 -0.66
FIN 3.65  1.76 0.37 1.45 0.18 0.55 -0.02 0.74 0.07
FRA 3.43  1.79 0.47 1.75 0.41 0.54 0.15 0.64 -0.57
GBR 2.73 0.99 0.27 1.33 0.32 0.35 0.10 0.55 0.13
GRC 3.67 4.37 0.30 -0.46 0.05 0.41 0.04 -0.95 -0.55
IRL 6.03  2.18 0.61 0.97 -0.05 0.49 -0.04 0.56 2.27
ISL 4.13  1.22 0.93 0.97 -0.09 0.82 -0.21 0.46 1.01
ITA 3.53  2.14 0.29 1.24 0.35 0.49 0.15 0.25 -0.14
JAM 1.80  2.06 0.86 0.41 -0.43 0.75 -0.08 0.18 -1.54
JOR 6.23  5.95 2.17 -0.83 -0.63 0.39 -0.14 -0.45 -1.06
JPN 5.26  3.54 0.58 2.42 0.56 0.92 0.34 0.57 -1.28
KEN 5.17  3.22 1.48 0.07 -0.79 0.95 0.16 -0.24 0.39
KOR 9.31 6.93 0.88 0.62 -0.03 0.71 0.40 -0.46 0.87
MEX 5.00 4.57 1.27 -0.18 -0.07 0.06 0.34 -0.51 -0.66
NLD 3.59  1.20 0.65 1.27 0.30 0.58 0.05 0.34 0.46
NOR 4.09 1.75 0.40 1.53 0.25 0.81 -0.03 0.50 0.41
NZL 2.39  0.47 0.77 0.76 0.15 0.68 -0.02 -0.05 0.39
PER 3.15  2.75 1.00 0.21 -0.20 0.49 0.10 -0.17 -0.81
PRT 4.71  3.09 0.39 1.20 -0.02 0.50 0.05 0.67 0.03
SWE 2.57 0.96 0.36 1.44 0.28 0.57 0.01 0.57 -0.20
THA 8.01  6.51 0.62 -0.73 -0.29  1.00 0.37 -1.79 1.60
TTO 3.62  2.65 0.83 -0.23 -0.41 0.15 -0.16 0.18 0.36
TUR 5.38  5.93 0.79 -1.33 -0.26 0.08 0.33 -1.48 -0.01
USA 3.97  1.70 0.84 1.49 0.52 0.09 0.28 0.59 -0.07
VEN 1.82  2.24 1.41 0.06 -0.10 0.05 0.08 0.04 -1.90
Among the 19 countries that presented positive contributions of technical progress, 18 are 
OECD members. Brazil is the only non-member of that organization that managed to have 
technical progress contributing for higher productivity, mainly in the 1965 to 1985 period. This 
trend matches that of three other Latin American countries that underwent a marked import 
substitution process, namely Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The fall in the pace of technical 
progress of these countries coincides with the debt crisis and economic liberalization, periods 
during which the industrialization process slows down its pace.  
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An important aspect pertains to the interpretation of technical regress (negative technical 
progress) that appears in the results of this study
9. First it should be pointed out that a frontier 
was not estimated for each country and therefore it is not a matter of saying that this or that 
country had “inward” shifts to their frontiers. The interpretation is quite difficult in light of the 
way that technical progress was achieved, by including a time trend in the model (and 
interactions of time with capital and labor). According to Arrow (1962), this procedure, which is 
rather common in the literature, is most of all a confession of ignorance. As discussed in Section 
3, the underlying idea here is that countries closer to the frontier (and on the forefront of technical 
progress) are responsible for the actual shift in the world production frontier. One way of 
interpreting technical regress in less developed nations is that it may be the result of changes that 
end up halting the production of some high-technology products and encouraging the 
manufacturing of low-technology products. Since GDP is the aggregation of value added in a 
number of industries, this sliding performance could be the result of production shifting from 
some highly productive sectors to others, where productivity is lower. 
All countries enjoyed rising technical efficiency, as shown in Table 4.3. That is a 
characteristic of the estimated model. The Battese & Coelli (1992) model imposes the restriction of a 
common η to all countries. In the global sample including the 75 countries, the estimated value for 
this parameter was positive, which resulted in a catch-up pattern for all countries: technical 
efficiency grows at decreasing rates. The countries that appeared closer to the frontier were: 
Thailand, Kenya, Japan, Iceland, Norway, Jamaica and South Korea. It is quite intuitive that 
Thailand, Japan and South Korea should appear at the top here, since they have made great effort 
to absorb technology. For the other countries, this conclusion does not seem to be so obvious. 
Nonetheless, Kenya, Iceland and Jamaica enjoyed very high rates of growth during some periods 
in the sample, which could suggest a movement towards the frontier whose cause could only be 
understood following a deeper investigation of the history of these economies (something beyond 
the scope of this study). Among countries with lesser gains of technical efficiency are the United 
                                                 
9 Other authors also report this kind of result using frontier techniques - Rao & Coelli (1998), for example.   
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States and Canada which makes sense, since both these countries are already close to the frontier. 
They are in fact pushing the frontier further. 
It is intuitive to conclude that countries with vast masses of population are those set to 
gain the most from scale effects. They are Brazil, South Korea, Thailand, Mexico and Japan. All 
of them but Japan are usually referred to as “developing” nations and have surely experienced 
leaping growth during at least some periods of the sample, based on a considerable accumulation 
of factors. It is also rather intuitive that countries with small population have gained less, or even 
lost productivity, as witnessed by the results of Ireland, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Jordan, Trinidad & 
Tobago and Iceland. 
The estimated model produces scores that reflect the levels of technical efficiency of these 
nations, but not levels of allocative efficiency. The effects of allocative efficiency are only 
evaluated in dynamic terms, and in it reflect either an approximation or a departure of the value 
of the estimated shares of income factors (λK and λL) from the their competitive values (i.e., 
factor remuneration from its marginal products). As shown in Table 3, countries that had the 
largest allocative efficiency gains were Austria, Finland, Portugal, France, Belgium, the United 
States and Japan. At the other end are countries that lost out with the dynamics of factor 
allocation. Most of the Latin American countries fall within this group, as well as South Korea 
(until 1985) and Thailand. Some of OECD’s poorest members are also among those countries 
that had poor performance in allocative efficiency terms, such as Greece and Turkey. 
We see systematic gains with factor allocation in richer economies and losses (or very 
modest gains) in poorer ones. It is interesting to point out that the differences between these two 
groups of countries regarding changes in allocative efficiency are even more marked in the first 
three periods (five-year periods) of the sample. It is well known that both Brazil and Thailand 
decided on a strategy of “growth without adjustment” in response to the oil shock of 1973, with 
increasing debt during this time. In Brazil at this time the II National Development Plan, was 
being implemented and government played a heavy hand in resource allocation in the economy 
and was responsible for large infrastructure investments. The importance of government in 
resource allocation is also a characteristic of South Korea during the early years in the sample.  
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Graph 2.  Total factor productivity, with and without allocative efficiency 
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The set of charts above shows the development of total factor productivity in six 
economies, calculated in two ways: (i) with allocative efficiency and (ii) without this component. 
The first aspect to be highlighted is the distinct patterns of behavior displayed by developed and 
developing nations. France, the United States and Japan present dynamic gains with resources 
allocation, and for them TFP computing allocative efficiency remains above the measure that 
excludes this component. The opposite happens in Brazil for most of the sample period and in all 
of it for Mexico. South Korea, on the other hand, has a distinct pattern, in which the curves cross 
each other, i.e., allocative efficiency inverts its impact, becoming a driver for productivity gains 
in that country. 
For Brazil, TFP computed without allocative efficiency is, usually superior, showing the 
effects of “ill allocation” of production factors. From the mid 80s to the mid 90s, this effect 
reverses and begins to contribute to productivity growth, even if very little. After that period the 
contribution turns negative again, even if less impressive than in the first five-year periods under 
study. Mexico also reduces the negative allocative effects as of the mid 80s, but never enough to 
contribute to a rise in productivity. On the other hand, France, the United States and Japan have 
persistent gains with allocative efficiency. 
6 6    T Th he e   r ro ol le e   o of f   t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   p pr ro og gr re es ss s   a an nd d   a al ll lo oc ca at ti iv ve e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y   i in n   t th he e   
e ec co on no om mi ic c   g gr ro ow wt th h   o of f   d de ev ve el lo op pe ed d   a an nd d   d de ev ve el lo op pi in ng g   n na at ti io on ns s   ( (1 19 97 70 0- -
2 20 00 00 0) )   
We will now take a closer look at the differences in economic growth patterns of 
developed and developing nations. Table 4 and Graph 3 bring data on GDP growth and the 
sources of growth for two groups of countries
10. Table 4 displays annual averages (for each five-
year period and for the whole 30 year period). For economic growth and each of its sources we 
computed the difference between the rate of change calculated for developed nations and that 
calculated for developing countries. The same was done for the productivity components. 
                                                 
10 The group of developed nations consists of OECD member countries except Mexico, Greece and Turkey, 
which are in the developing nations group. This last group includes, in addition to the above three, all other 
countries in the sample (total of 36 countries).   
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Table 4.  Sources of economic growth per group of countries and periods – % 
change 
Annual averages in the sub-periods*  Variable Countries** 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Annual 
average Accumulated
                    
Developed  5.33 3.92 3.44 2.30 3.62 2.04 3.57  4.04  228.22
Developing  5.29 5.14 5.64 1.93 3.38 4.12 2.90  4.74  301.10
GDP growth 
Difference  0.03 -1.16 -2.08  0.37  0.23 -2.00  0.65  -0.67  -18.17
                   
Developed  5.58 5.84 4.34 3.14 2.99 2.44 2.53  4.48  272.60
Developing  6.54 6.72 6.59 5.04 3.85 4.13 3.59  6.09  489.67
Capital 
accumulation 
Difference  -0.90 -0.83 -2.11 -1.81 -0.82 -1.63 -1.02  -1.52  -36.81
                   
Developed  0.97 1.19 0.89 0.77 0.59 0.85 0.65  0.98  34.14
Developing  2.95 2.82 2.81 2.68 2.41 2.15 1.91  2.96  139.92
Labor expansion 
Difference  -1.93 -1.59 -1.87 -1.86 -1.78 -1.27 -1.24  -1.92  -44.09
                   
Developed  4.32 2.70 2.53 1.52 3.01 1.17 2.91  3.03  144.68
Developing  2.27 2.25 2.76  -0.73 0.95 1.92 0.98  1.73  67.18
Change in GDP 
per worker 
Difference  2.00 0.43 -0.22  2.27  2.04 -0.74  1.91  1.28  46.36
                   
Developed  4.57 4.59 3.42 2.35 2.39 1.57 1.87  3.46  177.76
Developing  3.49 3.79 3.68 2.30 1.40 1.94 1.65  3.04  145.78
Change in 
capital  per 
worker 
Difference  1.05 0.77 -0.25  0.05  0.98 -0.36  0.22  0.41  13.02
                   
Developed  1.32 1.56 1.34 1.04 0.97 0.68 0.59  1.25  45.14
Developing  0.07 -0.10 -0.23 -0.11 -0.16 -0.35 -0.37  -0.21  -6.11
Change in TFP 
Difference  1.25 1.66 1.58 1.15 1.14 1.03 0.97  1.46  54.58
                   
Developed  0.54 0.44 0.33 0.21 0.09  -0.04  -0.17  0.23  7.22
Developing  0.04 -0.06 -0.16 -0.28 -0.41 -0.53 -0.66  -0.34  -9.76
Technical 
progress 
Difference  0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49  0.58  18.82
                   
Developed  0.56 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.38  0.54  17.63




Difference  0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09  0.13  3.98
                   
Developed  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.07  2.25




Difference  0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  -0.04  -1.24
                   
Developed  0.17 0.52 0.45 0.30 0.38 0.24 0.31  0.39  12.50




Difference  0.57 1.02 1.00 0.59 0.59 0.49 0.45  0.78  26.40
                    
* The years represent the final point of each period, e.g., 1970 refers to the five-year period from 1966 to 1970, 1975 refers to the 
five-year period from 1971 to 1975, and so on. ** The values in this table were calculated by taking the simple average of the rates of change 
during the sub-periods for the countries comprising each group. The accumulated affect is computed by compounding the rates and discounting 
the differences (not linearly).  
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We see that developing nations grew more than developed ones (18.2%). This happened 
because both capital accumulation as well as labor expansion were larger in developing countries. 
However, the growth of GDP per worker was greater in developed countries, which can be 
attributed basically to two factors: (i) the difference between the growth rates of capital and labor 
was greater in developed nations, thus providing higher growth of capital per worker; (ii) the 
change in TFP in developed nations was considerably higher than in developing ones (yet it 
should be said that in the second group this change pushed down GDP’s growth). The differences 
between the two groups in regard to growth of capital per worker are well below the differences 
in TFP growth. This suggests that productivity plays a role of great importance in the 
development of nations, better yet, that it might explain a significant part of the differences in 
GDP per capita growth between rich and poor countries. 
If we take a look at the relative importance of the components of productivity, we see that 
developed nations have some advantages, even if minor, in regard to technical efficiency. On the 
other hand, we also see that this difference is in part offset by positive scale effects enjoyed by 
developing countries. Judging by the magnitude of the differences between the groups of 
countries regarding the pace of technical progress and the evolution of allocative efficiency, we 
are able to conclude that these two components explain most of the differences in productivity 
existing between the two groups. While developed nations enjoyed technical progress of 7.2% in 
the 30 years analyzed here, developing countries in fact suffered a 9.8% drop in that component, 
a gap that adds up to 18.8%. We also notice that rich countries accumulated sizable 12.5% in 
allocative efficiency improvement, at the same time that in poor countries this variable fell 11%. 
Here we have an accumulated difference of 26.4% in this component, which places this figure at 
the forefront in explaining the differences in productivity among the two groups of countries, and 
consequently the differences in the rates of output growth. 
Lower rates of growth of output per worker in developing nations, in comparison with 
developed ones lead to divergence between the standards of living of the two groups of countries. 
In light of this, common aspects among countries having similar growth patterns, (and similar 
behavior for the difference between the two measures of TFP mentioned before – with and 
without allocative efficiency), should be sought. It might not be unreasonable to assume that the  
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liberalization process witnessed in developing countries has helped improve resource allocation. 
Both Brazil and Mexico had a reduction in allocative inefficiency at the same time these 
economies underwent greater liberalization, as seen in Graph 2. Following this line of thinking, 
South Korea, a country that started the liberalization process earlier, inverted the allocative 
efficiency effect in the 80s, and maintained gains of productivity with this component of TFP 
since then. 
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Graph 3. Sources of growth per group of countries 
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Graph 4 reinforces this notion. It illustrates the relation between the governance index 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999), and the average annual change in 
allocative efficiency for the 36 economies, from 1970 to 2000. As expected, the economies with 
better governance enjoyed less distortions and consequently greater allocative gains. The other 
graph shows the relation, for 33 of these 36 economies, from 1970 to 2000, between allocative 
efficiency and the degree of liberalization of financial flows, according to the measure suggested 
by Santana (2004). Also in this case, where we see five-year changes in these two measures, the 
elimination of distortions brought by barriers to the flow of capital seem to benefit the growth of 
allocative efficiency. 
Graph 4   Governance, financial liberalization and allocative efficiency 
Governance Index

























































































Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999), Santana (2004) and own data.  
7 7    C Co on nc cl lu ud di in ng g   r re em ma ar rk ks s   
Two excerpts from contemporary remarks made by Robert Solow reveal that much 
remains to be clarified regarding the determinants of economic growth and their relative 
importance: 
“…Bits of experience and conversation have suggested to me that it may be a 
mistake to think of R&D as the only ultimate source of growth in total factor 
productivity. I don’t doubt that it is the largest ultimate source. But there seems to be a  
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lot of productivity improvement that originates in people and processes that are not 
usually connected with R&D. Some of it comes from the shop floor, from the ideas of 
experienced and observant production workers. This should probably be connected with 
Arrow’s “learning by doing” or with the Japanese slogan about “continuous 
improvement.” There is another part that seems to originate in management practices – 
in design, in the choice of product mixes, even in marketing. Notice that this is not just 
straightforward enhancement of productive efficiency. All this talk about value creation 
may be more than a buzzword; it may even be important. We need to understand much 
more about how these kinds of values get reflected in measured real output, and whether 
they can be usefully analyzed by our methods.”   
Solow (2001a) 
“…the nontechnological sources of differences in TFP may be more important 
than the technological ones. Indeed they may control the technological ones, especially 
in developing countries.” 
Solow (2001b) 
The results presented in the previous sections readily provide information to clarify the 
apparent contradiction between these two statements. Even if restricted to a relatively small 
sample of countries, the results presented in Table 4 reveal that, in fact, for developed nations 
technical progress and technical efficiency changes are responsible for the larger part of TFP 
change accumulated in the last 30 years: of the 45.1 percentage points increase in TFP, 26.1 can 
be attributed to the joint effect of these two components (i.e., around 58% of all change). Yet for 
developing nations, for which TFP had a 6.1 percentage points decrease during the same period, 
the component that contributed the most to this result is allocative efficiency change, which 
reduced productivity in nearly 11 percentage points. Together, technical progress and changes in 
allocative efficiency contributed with a small accumulated growth of 2.1 percentage points. This 
technological performance is unsatisfactory in large part due to relatively small investments made 
by poor nations in R&D. 
The evidence presented here also seems to corroborate the second statement made by 
Solow. As argued in the previous section, allocative efficiency is, among the components of TFP, 
the one that most contributes to the gap between the two groups of nations (with respect to  
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income per worker and TFP) - about 60% of these differences. The pattern of technical progress 
is behind the other 40% of the gap. These facts point out that economic policies that directly 
affect factor allocation are extremely relevant in explaining the differences in the growth 
performance between developed and developing countries. 
Regarding the changes in productivity associated with technological diffusion and waste 
reduction, the results of the article allow us to identify the importance of the increase in technical 
efficiency estimated by the stochastic frontier model, which contributes both to the growth of 
developed nations as well as developing ones. This perception seems to be in part shared by 
Robert Solow. The examples given by Solow are typical of what the production frontier literature 
calls efficiency improvement, both technical and allocative. Since he does not consider the 
explicit possibility of inefficiency, Solow seems to consider these phenomena some sort of 
innovation, yet not related to R&D expenses (design, marketing, etc.). However, we clearly see 
that he feels that technical progress leveraged by R&D spending is not the only driver of 
productivity. 
Recently, Easterly & Levine (2001) added fuel to the existing controversy among the 
scholars espousing the “sources of economic growth”, on the relative importance of factor 
accumulation and productivity. The underlying objective of these authors is to demonstrate that, 
unlike what is preached by the “Neoclassical Revival”, the focus of investigation of economic 
growth should be productivity and its determinants
11. The authors list five stylized facts regarding 
economic growth to underpin their idea. Some of their findings are corroborated by the results of 
this study, but others are not.  
The first stylized fact presented by these authors states that differences in TFP growth 
explain the differences in per-capita income and per-capita income growth rates among the 
various countries. Although factor accumulation may be important to trigger growth and be 
responsible for a sizable share of this growth in a number of countries, it is not able to explain the 
                                                 
11 Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) use this terminology created by Alwyn Young to qualify a body of 
studies that tries to counter the New Growth Theory and is associated to the hypothesis that the differences in 
levels and in per-capita income variation among nations are caused by differences in physical and human 
capital accumulation. Some examples of this line of work are Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992), Young (1994, 
1995) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995).  
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differences in level of income or in rates of income change among nations. In relation to this fact, 
it should be pointed out, first of all, that the great importance of capital accumulation in the 
countries’ growth rate also appears in the results for the reduced 36-country sample. In fact, we 
find that 80% of the growth would be attributable to the accumulation of capital and labor, and 
only the 20% remaining would come from productivity gains. The results vary when we calculate 
separately the average for the group of 24 developed countries (factor accumulation is lower, 
close to 63% of the growth) and for the group of 12 developing nations (contribution to 
productivity is negative and therefore the factor accumulation is behind all the economic growth). 
If our reference is output per worker, the importance of capital accumulation remains 
high. With some additional calculations based on the numbers listed in Table 4, we conclude that 
on average 62.1% of the GDP growth is due to capital accumulation. Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997) reach a similar result for a sample of 98 countries: on average 70% of economic growth is 
the result of physical and human capital accumulation. The comparison is obviously limited, 
because human capital is not considered in this study and because the samples are different. 
Nonetheless, the reduced sample used in this article contains 24 of the 30 OECD members, while 
the sample used by Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) contains all of them. Consequently, we 
can conclude that most of the nations that differentiate the two samples are developing 
economies, which generally have a higher share of capital in income. Thus, the inclusion of these 
countries would tend to raise the participation of factors in the growth of GDP per worker (above 
62.1%), bringing the results of the two samples closer to each other. 
Regarding income per capita, the difference between rich and poor nations is the second 
stylized fact pointed out by Easterly & Levine (2001). According to these authors, this 
phenomenon is not very consistent with the analytical apparatus that emphasizes factor 
accumulation with diminishing returns and lack of economies of scale. It would be more 
appropriate to emphasize productivity growth based on technology and increasing returns. 
Klenow (2001) argues however that institutional or political institutions (such as tax structure, 
protectionism, lack of property rights, etc.) may reduce the accumulation of physical and human 
capital. In line with the ideas suggested by Easterly & Levine (2001), the results of this article 
reject an interpretation based on factor accumulation for this discrepancy.  
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The divergence between developed and developing nations was one of the results found 
using the empirical model applied in this study. Moreover, it is clear that the differences in the 
rates of productivity change are behind all the differences in the rates of growth of GDP per 
worker (the accumulation of factors contributed towards reducing such differences). Note that 
this result was obtained within the traditional framework of an aggregated production function 
with diminishing returns. It was not necessary to incorporate in the analysis a new sector (a 
knowledge production sector presenting increasing returns). 
The third stylized factor in the Easterly & Levine (2001) list suggests that the 
accumulation of factors is persistent, at the same time that economic growth is not. Considering 
that changes in the rate of growth depend both on changes in factor accumulation as well as on 
changes in productivity, the validity of this stylized fact implies that TFP cannot be persistent. A 
consequence of this is that productivity measures would necessarily have a volatile behavior. 
This could be avoided if production data to be explained reflected the potential, rather than the 
actual product. 
Robert Solow (Solow, 2001a) says that growth theory is a theory of the evolution of 
potential product. This is justified by the fact that the countries’ growth paths do not resemble at 
all the concept of steady state. In economies where agriculture has a considerable weight, sudden 
weather changes or pests can bias the traditional TFP measure. Consequently, either we work 
with potential output as a dependent variable or we add explanatory variables that controls for 
weather changes or pests. Demand fluctuations are another source of deviation of output from its 
balanced growth path. If we return to Graph 3 and examine the evolution of productivity change, 
we see that it has an absolutely “serene” behavior. Here probably lies the greatest contribution of 
the approach combining stochastic production frontier estimation and the Bauer-Kumbhakar 
decomposition: it allows us to separate the effects of random shocks from the other TFP 
components. All the other TFP components have a clear trend, with little fluctuation, except 
perhaps for allocative efficiency, which responds to policies. 
The specification of the stochastic frontier model with two error components, each with 
one type of probability distribution, allows us to estimate the component of technical inefficiency 
and to evaluate the magnitude of the random component, as a residual. In fact, it is possible even  
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 143   •   DEZEMBRO DE 2004   •   34 
to evaluate if the assumptions of a normal truncated distribution for the technical efficiency 
component and of normal distribution with zero mean for the random component describe well 
the behavior of the observed data. The analysis of the residuals shows that the presumption of 
normal distribution with zero mean seems to suit the data well. 
The fourth stylized fact points out that production factors tend to flow towards the same 
direction and as a consequence economic activity is quite concentrated. This is valid not only 
among countries but also within them (regions, states and cities). If there were no productivity 
differences, the trend would be exactly the opposite, i.e., that of an even distribution of factors 
among the various countries, because of the presence of decreasing returns. Differences in 
policies could explain factor accumulation (regulation, tax structure, legal systems, public 
education, etc.). However, usually these policies have a nationwide scope and would not be 
helpful in explaining concentration within the nations. Easterly & Levine (2001) do not provide a 
single explanation for this phenomenon and argue that such stylized fact is consistent with 
existing explanations in terms of poverty traps, intra-group factors or geographical externalities, 
and is also consistent with explanations based on differences of productivity caused by 
technological differences. 
The results of this article have shown that developing nations accumulate production 
factors at a much faster pace than that of developed nations and for this reason also grow faster. 
The model used presents a measure of scale effects for the sample countries that is intuitive but 
not fully consistent with the notion of concentration of economic activity, because there are a 
number of developing economies that presented increasing returns to scale (India, Indonesia, 
Brazil and Mexico, to name a few). However the magnitude of the scale effects estimated is not 
up to the task of  explaining the fourth stylized fact identified by Easterly & Levine (2001). 
The fifth and last stylized fact states that policies implemented by nations have a relevant 
impact on long-term growth rates of these nations. The authors try to show that variables related 
to policy decisions of nationwide scope, such as education, degree of trade and financial 
liberalization, and the size of the government, among other factors are related to countries’ 
growth rates and to TFP. Changes in government policy have a fundamental impact on allocative  
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efficiency. As seen, the results presented in this study show the great importance of allocative 
efficiency change in productivity change, and consequently in growth rate differences. 
With a clear economic interpretation and the advantage of separating random shocks from 
the regular behavior of the economies, the stochastic frontier approach combined with flexible 
functional forms and the TFP decomposition described here, seem to be up to the task of 
providing a broad range of explanations in the field of economic growth.  
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A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x   
The likelihood ratio statistic is given by ] L ˆ L ˆ [ 2 NR R − − = λ , where  R L ˆ e  NR L ˆ  are, 
respectively, the estimated log-likelihood of the described model and of the non-restrict model. 
The table below summarizes the tests performed. The null hypothesis under question is always 
that the model identified in the matrix column is nested in the model of the matrix line. The LR 
statistic has a χ
2 (DF) type distribution, where DF shows the difference in the degrees of freedom 
among the various models. If the value expressed in the cell of the statistics matrix is greater than 
the critical value, then the null hypothesis  cannot be rejected, otherwise it can be rejected. 
 
Table A.1 Likelihood ratio tests  

















































































Cobb  –Douglas  w/o    PT  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Note: NC = not comparable; TL= translog; Cobb-Douglas PT = with time trend; Cobb-Douglas w/o PT = without time trend. 
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